It should be emphasized that vertical tensions are not inherently bad. Rather, they are the essence of democratic debate, which acts as a mechanism for healthy feedback on some negative aspects of globalization, modernization, and how governments respond to transnational security threats. Some explanations for tensions in the social contract point to economic insecurity and cultural reaction, both of which can lead to resentment against progressive norms such as multiculturalism, while others blame institutions for their failure to solve long-standing problems such as social inequality and welfare state failures.  If marginalized groups of citizens feel that their security and livelihoods are threatened, they may no longer be inclined to support their country`s institutions. According to Locke, the state of nature is not a state of individuals, as is the case with Hobbes. Rather, it is populated by mothers and fathers with their children or families – what he calls « conjugal society » (para. 78). These societies are based on voluntary agreements to care for children together, and they are moral, but not political. Political society is born when men representing their families come together in the state of nature and agree that everyone will give up executive power to punish those who transgress natural law and surrender that power to public power to a government. After doing so, they are subject to the will of the majority. In other words, by concluding a pact to leave the state of nature and shape society, they make « a political organ under one government » (para. 97) and submit to the will of that body. One adheres to such a body, either from the beginning or after it has already been established by others, only by express consent.
After creating a political society and a government by their consent, people receive three things that they lacked in the state of nature: laws, judges to pass laws, and the executive power needed to enforce those laws. Every human being therefore hands over the power to protect himself and punish violators of the natural law to the government he created by the Pact. Many recent developments in negotiation theory and the social contract have adopted dynamic (Muldoon 2017, Vanderschraaf to come) or even evolutionary approaches to model collective bargaining (Alexander and Skyrms 1999, Skyrms 2014). This shows a general gap in negotiation patterns between what we can call axiomatic models and process models. The traditional axiomatic approach to the problem of negotiation dates back to John Nash, codified by John Harsanyi and popularized by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957). Several fundamental negotiating solutions have emerged from this tradition. Each uses a slightly different set of axioms to generate a unique and generally applicable method of dividing a surplus. These are mainly the Egalitarian (Raiffa 1953), the Nash (1950), the Stabilized Nash (Moehler 2010), the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) and Gauthier`s Minimax Relative Concession (1986). The main point of contention between these theories is whether Nash`s independence axiom should be used or whether an axiom of monotony should be used (as the egalitarian relative concessions of Kalai-Smorodinsky and Minimax do), although to some extent all axioms have been denied. The social contract begins with Rousseau`s most frequently quoted phrase: « Man is born free, and he is everywhere chained » (49). This claim is the conceptual bridge between the descriptive work of the Second Discourse and the prescriptive work that will come.
Humans are essentially free and were free in the state of nature, but the « progress » of civilization has replaced this freedom with dependence, economic and social inequality, and the extent to which we judge ourselves with comparisons with others. Since a return to the state of nature is neither feasible nor desirable, the purpose of politics is to give us back freedom and thus reconcile who we really are and essentially with the way we live together. So this is the fundamental philosophical problem that the social contract seeks to solve: how can we be free and live together? In other words, how can we live together without succumbing to the power and coercion of others? We can do this, Rousseau said, by subjecting our individual, special will to the collective or general will created by agreement with other free and equal people. Like Hobbes and Locke before him and unlike ancient philosophers, all human beings are inherently equal, so no one has the natural right to rule others, and therefore the only authority justified is the authority that flows from agreements or covenants. A justified contract must meet the condition of full publicity: its full justification must indeed be acceptable to the members of a well-ordered society. The hypothetical agreement itself provides only what Rawls (1996, 386) calls a « pro tanto » or « as far as possible » justification of the principles of justice. « Full justification » is obtained only when « people advocate and want liberal justice for the specific (and often contradictory) reasons implicit in the reasonable global doctrines they advocate » (Freeman 2007b, 19). Understood in this way, Rawls` concern for the stability of justice as equity that motivated the transition to political liberalism is in itself a matter of justification (Weithman, 2010). Only when the principles of justice are so stable are they fully justified. Rawls` concern for stability and publicity, however, is not idiosyncratic and is shared by all contemporary contract theorists. It is significant that even theorists such as Buchanan (2000 , 26-27), Gauthier (1986, 348) and Binmore (2005, 5-7) – who are so different from Rawls in other respects – share his concern for stability. Putting the Netherlands into perspective by looking at Europe as a whole reinvents the threat posed by vertical tensions as they intensify.
The ECONOMIC SECURITY OF THE EU is threatened by Brexit and the possible fragmentation of the Schengen area. This lack of cohesion could gradually turn into a threat if it leads to a lack of support for the EU, which receives 76% of Dutch exports.  In Europe, there is a high risk of violations of human rights and democracy, as can be clearly seen in Hungary and Poland. .